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THE CHINA FACTOR:
CANADA'S TRADE REMEDY RESPONSE TO CHINA'S
ECONOMIC CHALLENGE
t

Lawrence L. Herman
I.

Introduction

Growing concern is being voiced in the Canadian manufacturing sector
over the huge and unrelenting increase in Chinese goods entering the market.
This has produced allegations of unfair trading, and Canadian companies
have increasingly resorted to invoking Canada's trade remedy laws as one
response to this phenomenon. The results of these cases are mixed, however.
While some complainants have succeeded, the overall results are less than
decisive that Chinese-origin imports have been massively dumped or
subsidized or have been injuring Canadian production.
Dumping complaints against Chinese imports under Canada's Special
Import Measures Act' ("SIMA") have been around for many years. Until
recently, Canada allowed the use of surrogate-country data for purposes of
estimating Chinese dumping margins, given the policy of the Canada Border
Services Agency ("CBSA" or "Agency") and its predecessors that China was
a non-market economy country. This long-standing policy has been gradually
changed over the last ten years, culminating in a key policy statement by the
I Lawrence L. Herman, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, Toronto. Mr. Herman is a
member of the Canada-US Law Institute's Executive Board. This article was originally
presented at a CUSLI Conference in Washington, D.C., in December 2006. The reader is
asked to bear in mind that developments have occurred since that time and therefore some of
the references should be adjusted accordingly.
* Remarks occurred at an event entitled The Economic Challenges
of China: US &
Canadian Responses, held on December 8 2006, and sponsored by Steptoe & Johnson, LLP
and Kaye Scholer.
1 Special Import Measures Act ("SIMA"), R.S.C., ch. S 15 (1985) (covers various antidumping liabilities, as well as countervailing and provisional duties). SIMA came into force in
1984, incorporating Canada's international obligations under the GATI and the former GATIT
Codes. It has been amended over the years to implement Canada's obligations under the 1987
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement and the
1994 World Trade Organization Agreement. Details on the implementation of trade relief are
contained in the Special Import Measures Regulations. See, e.g., Special Import Measures
Regulations SOR/1984-927 (Can.) (amending SIMA, R.S.C., ch. S 15, § 17 (1985)).
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Agency in 2004 that, unless proven otherwise, it will consider China to be
operating under free market principles.
With respect to subsidies, unlike the United States, Canadian law permits
2
the application of countervailing duties on goods from China. Canadian
countervail cases against China, however, were non-existent until 2004.
Since then, partially resulting from the change in CBSA policy regarding
market-economy countries, there have been a number of investigations and
two final determinations resulting in countervailing duties on Chinese
imports. Because complete information from the Chinese government on its
subsidy programs was not provided, however, the jury is still out on just how
many, and to what extent, Chinese government programs are aiding
manufacturing industries in that country.
With respect to safeguards ("emergency" relief), Canadian laws were
changed in 2002 to implement China's World Trade Organization ("WTO")
accession protocol and to permit targeted cases to be taken against Chinese
products that are alleged to have caused market disruption. 3 The Canadian
experience in the single China safeguard case to date has not been positive.
The government has signaled a reluctance to implement safeguard relief - for
a variety of reasons - against consumer products coming from China.
II. Changes in Canadian Policy on China's Market Economy Status
China had historically been considered a state-trading nation in dumping
investigations by the CBSA and its predecessors, which have used surrogatecountry information to estimate Chinese normal values. Typical of its
approach was the investigation in Carbon Steel Plate4 in 1997, where the
CBSA's predecessor agency said this:
The Department has historically designated China as a state-controlled
economy with the result that normal values for imports from China

2

Subsidy-countervail complaints in Canada are also governed by SIMA, which makes no

distinction between subsidies in a market economy country and subsidies in a state-controlled
or non-market economy country. Under SIMA's definition of "subsidy," the necessary criteria
depend not on the nature of the economic system but whether a financial or other contribution
has been provided by the state and a benefit conferred on the recipient. See SIMA, supra note
1, § 2(l)(i)(a), (b).
3 Safeguard relief in Canada is governed by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal
Act ("CITT Act"), R.S.C., ch. 47 (1985) (4th Supp.), which was amended to implement
Canada's rights and obligations under the WTO accession protocol with China.
4 Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate - Statement of Reasons for Final Determination,
File No. 4258-102, AD/l 139 (Can. Border Services Agency Sept. 25, 1997), available at
http://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/adI 139/adI 139p-eng.html.
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have generally been determined on the basis of sales of like goods in a
third or surrogate country.
At the time of initiation, the Department forwarded a Request for
Information to the Chinese Government and exporters in an effort to
determine whether the steel industry in China should still be
considered to be state-controlled. In response, the Department received
submissions from the Government as well as two exporters - Shanghai
Pudong Iron & Steel (Group) Co. Ltd. and Angang Group
International Corporation.
In reviewing these submissions, the Department identified additional
information requirements and supplementary Requests for Information
were issued.
The Government of China responded to the Department's
supplementary Request for Information just prior to the preliminary
determination. Based on a review of the submission, additional
information and clarifications were required. Accordingly, shortly
after the preliminary determination, another supplementary Request
for Information was sent out.
No response was received from the Chinese Government or the two
exporters regarding the Department's latest Requests for Information.

As responses to the Department's latest Requests for Information have
not been received and on-site verification has yet to take place, the
Deputy Minister cannot form an opinion as to whether the steel
industry in China continues to be state-controlled under the provisions
of the SIMA.
As with Russia, the economy of China has historically been
considered to be state-controlled.Accordingly, normal values for the
subject goods of Chinese origin were also established by ministerial
specification on the basis of the average
normal value found for like
5
goods in three surrogate countries.
The above-cited passage exemplifies a long-standing policy on the part of
Canada's investigating agencies that had considered China to be a nonmarket economy unless otherwise demonstrated, meaning that the burden
was on the exporters and Chinese government to make the case. 6 This policy
5 Id. (emphasis added).

6 Other illustrative cases where the Agency and its predecessor relied on generallyavailable information to conclude that China was a non-market economy country and that the
sector under investigation was not based on free market principles include: Certain Xanthates
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obviously facilitated the task of Canadian complainants, who were faced with
difficulties obtaining reliable Chinese domestic selling-price information or
estimating Chinese production costs that bore any semblance of reality.
The Agency's policy began to shift in the early years of the present
decade. An illustration of this is Laminated Windshields,7 a dumping case
initiated in 2001. The Agency accepted the complainant's submissions on
initiation that China was a non-market economy. 8 It maintained this view at
the Preliminary Determination, albeit with some cautionary observations. 9
The full surprise was saved for the Final Determination where the Agency
changed course and arrived at the following conclusion:
Based on the analysis of the responses received from the government,
the four exporters and publicly available information as well as
- Statement of Reasons for Final Determination, File No. 4240-50, AD/1282 (Can. Border
Services Agency Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/ie/ad1282/ad1282i-eng.html [hereinafter Xanthates - Final]; Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel
Sheet - Statement of Reasons for Final Determination, File No. 4258-114/AD-1262 (Can.
Border Services Agency July 18, 2001), availableat http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsilerrre/rr200l-006/rr200l-006s-eng.html; Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sheet Products Statement of Reasons for Final Determination, File No. 4218-1 1/CV92, 4258-113/AD-1258
(Can. Border Services Agency June 4, 2001), available at http://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/ie/ad1258/ad1258i-eng.html; Garlic, Fresh or Frozen - Statement of Reasons for Final
Determination, File No. 4237-89, AD/1250 (Can. Border Services Agency Apr. 2, 2001),
availableat http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1250/adl250f-eng.html.
7 Automotive Laminated Windshields - Statement of Reasons for Initiation of
Investigation, File No. 4264-60, AD/1278 (Can. Border Services Agency Dec. 18, 2001)
available at http://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/adl 278/ad 1278i-eng.html
[hereinafter
Laminated Windshields - Initiation]; Automotive Laminated Windshields - Statement of
Reasons for Preliminary Determination, File No 4264-60, AD/1278 (Can. Border Services
Agency May 2, 2002) available at http://www.cbsa.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1278/ad1278peng.html [hereinafter Laminated Windshields - Preliminary]; and Automotive Laminated
Windshields - Statement of Reasons for Final Determination, File No. 4264-60, AD/1278
(Can. Border Services Agency July 31, 2002), available at http://customscanada.com/simalmsi/i-e/ad1278/ad1278i-eng.html [hereinafter Laminated Windshield - Final]. Laminated
Windshields - Initiation, Laminated Windshields - Preliminary,and Laminated Windshield Finalare hereinafter collectively referred to as Laminated Windshields.
8 See Laminated Windshields - Initiation,supra note
7.
9 See Laminated Windshields - Preliminary,supra note 7. The Agency stated, however,
that its consideration of China as a non-market economy was still under consideration:
In view of the amount of information provided, the CCRA has not completed its
analysis and cannot at this time, form an opinion as to whether section 20 of SIMA is
applicable to exports from China. Verification visits to the government, exporters and
vendors of the subject goods will be made at the earliest opportunity to obtain
clarification deemed essential to enable the Commissioner to form an opinion on the
matter. The examination of all the information collected so far in addition to the
further clarifications will allow the Commissioner to form an opinion on whether
sections 20, 15 to 19, or 29 of SIMA apply to the calculation of the normal value of
ARG windshields. Id.
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information retrieved during the verification visits, pursuant to
subsection 20(1) of SIMA, the Commissioner is of the opinion that the
government of China does not have a monopoly or substantial
monopoly over it's export trade in the replacement windshield
industry. The Commissioner is also of the opinion that the government
of China does not substantially determine domestic prices and that
there is no sufficient reason to believe that these prices would be
different in a competitive market. Consequently, the CCRA considers
that China's replacement windshield industry operates under market
conditions and that the provisions of section 20 do not apply.' 0
In another subsidy investigation in Leather Safety Footwear 1 in 2001,
later in that same year, the CBSA reverted to surrogate-country data but only
because of insufficient information from the Chinese Government to show
that free market principles were in operation. The Agency made it clear,
however, that with more complete information from the Chinese end, it
would be prepared to hold that that country and the industry concerned to be
operating on a free market basis:
The government of China provided a response to the CCRA's
questionnaire regarding the economic conditions in the footwear
sector. This submission was deemed to be incomplete and
inconclusive with respect to whether economic reforms have
progressed sufficiently such that the footwear sector is no longer
operating in non-market economic conditions.
For the purpose of the preliminary determination of dumping, the
CCRA maintained its position that the footwear industry in China is
operating under non-market conditions....
In the absence of sufficient information from the government of China
and the producers in the surrogate countries, normal values were
estimated on the basis of the best available information, i.e.
information supplied in the complaint.
The government of China has not responded to a supplementary RFI
issued at the time of the preliminary determination of dumping.
Therefore, the CCRA's position that footwear industry in China is
operating under non-market conditions remains unchanged. As a
10 Laminated Windshields - Final, supra note 7 (emphasis added).

11 Leather Footwear with Metal Toe Caps Excluding Waterproof Footwear Subject to the
Finding by the CITr in Inquiry No. NQ-2000-004 - Statement of Reasons for Final
Determination, File No. 4261-124, AD/1275 (Can. Border Services Agency Nov. 27, 2001),
available at http://www.citt-tcce.gc.ca/dumping/preinq/determin/pi2b00le.asp [hereinafter
Leather Safety Footwear- Final].
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result, the CCRA continued its attempts to obtain information from
producers in a surrogate
country. These requests have yielded no
12
information to date.
Later investigations following Laminated Windshields and Leather Safety
Footwear continued the Agency's policy of holding that China was a nonmarket economy but with the caveat repeated that, if enough information was
provided to the Agency by Chinese authorities and by the industries under
investigation, it would be prepared to deem that particular
sector to be a free
13
market and disallow use of surrogate-country data.
That policy change was formally promulgated by the CBSA in an
important notice to stakeholders in June 2004.14 The notice said that
substantial progress had been made in former Communist countries,
including countries like China, toward market liberalization. The Agency
therefore decided to abandon its existing policy of a blanket categorization of
China as a non-market economy country in favour of a case-by-case
examination of the sector under review.
A critical part of the new policy was the change in the nature of the
evidence that the Agency would rely on in applying that policy. As noted
previously, the Agency had traditionally proceeded on the assumption that
any country, like China, operating under a Communist or state-controlled
form of government was a non-market economy. The burden was on the
exporters' government and on responding industries to disprove that fact.
The new policy shifted the evidentiary burden to the complaining industry in
Canada. As stated by the Agency:
Regardless of the country, sector or product under investigation, antidumping investigations and re-investigations (administrative reviews)
are to be initiated on the presumption that section 20 of the Act is not
applicable to the sector under investigation unless there is evidence
that suggests otherwise.

12

id.

13 See Xanthates - Final,supra note 6; see also Carbon Steel Pipe Fittings - Statement of
Reasons for Final Determination, File: 4258-119, AD-1291 (Can. Border Services Agency
June, 27, 2003), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/adl291/adl291ieng.html.
See Canadian Border Services Agency, Information on the Application of Section 20 of
the Special Import Measures Act ("Non-market Economies") (August 2007), available at
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/section20-eng.html.
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If a complainant alleges that goods are exported to Canada from a
country in which the conditions described under section 20 apply, the
complainant must provide information to support the allegation.
The President will not initiate a section 20 inquiry if there is
insufficient evidence that the conditions of section 20 may exist in the
sector under investigation.
If the complainant cannot provide sufficient evidence regarding the
conditions of section 20, the evidence of dumping provided in the
written complaint must be based on prices or costs of the goods1 in
the
5
country of export ratherthan prices and costs in a third country.
Section 20 of SIMA, it should be explained, deals with determinations of
non-market economy status and the conditions under which surrogatecountry normal value information is permitted. It reads in part:
(1)

Where goods sold to an importer in Canada are
shipped directly to Canada
(a) from a prescribedcountry where, in the opinion
of the Commissioner, domestic prices are
substantially determined by the government of
that country and there is sufficient reason to
believe that they are not substantially the same
as they would be if they were determined in a
competitive market, or
(b) from any other country where, in the opinion of
the Commissioner,
(i) the government of that country has a
monopoly or substantial monopoly of its
export trade, and
(ii) domestic
prices
are
substantially
determined by the government of that
country and there is sufficient reason to
believe that they are not substantially the
same as they would be if they1 6 were
determined in a competitive market,

then the normal value of the goods may be determined by reference to either
the selling prices at the same level of trade and under the same conditions in

15 Id. (emphases added).
16 (emphasis added).
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a surrogate country or, under certain circumstances, by reference to the costs
of production, etc., in that surrogate country."
There is an important distinction between paragraph (a) and paragraph (b)
of Section 20(1): under paragraph (b), the normal value of imported goods
from a non-market country will be determined where, in the opinion of the
CBSA (1) the government of that country has a monopoly or substantial
monopoly of its export trade and (2) domestic prices are substantially
determined by the government of that country and there is sufficient reason
to believe that they are not substantially the same as they would be if they
were determined in a competitive market. Under paragraph (a), however, for
any "prescribed country" the conditions for finding non-market economy
stringent. China is the only country to so far have been
status are less
"prescribed.' 18 In order to find that a Chinese industry is operating in a nonmarket situation and thus to use surrogate-country data, the President of the
CBSA has to be of the opinion only that domestic prices in China are
substantially determined by that government (as opposed to there being a
government monopoly). The other condition - that there must be "sufficient
reason to believe" that such prices are not substantially the same as they
would be in a competitive market - remains the same as for non-prescribed
countries.
But while the conditions for finding non-market economy status are less
stringent for China, the onus under the June 2004 CBSA policy still remains
on the complaining industry to satisfy the Agency as to the existence of the
necessary conditions. These provisions will be applied on a sectoral basis by
the Agency.
The result is that determining non-market economy conditions for China
in any given case will not only depend on the circumstances of the particular
sector, it will require the complaining industry to present evidence in its
complaint to justify the Section 20 designation for China on the basis of the
above two Section 20 factors. Moreover, the fact that it found that the
17 Id.

18

As part of Canada's implementation of the WTO accession protocol, China has been

listed as a prescribed country under section 20(1)(a) of the CIT'f Act, the only country
designated by order in council. See Special Import Measures Regulations SOR/96-255; see
also Government of Canada, RegulationsAmending the Special Import Measures Regulations,
available
at
CANADA
GAZETTE,
October
9,
2002,
at
1,
http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partI2002/20021009/html/sor349-e.html; but cf.An Act to Amend
Certain Acts as a Result of the Accession of the People's Republic of China to the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter Act Amending China's Accession to
the
WTO], B. C-50, House of Commons of Can. (2002), available at
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Bills/37 1/Govemment/C-50/c-50_3/90177bE.html;
Information on the Application of Section 20 of the Special Import Measures Act ("Nonmarket Economies"), supranote 14.
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conditions under Section 20 exist in a particular sector in China will not
necessarily have any relevance in respect of any other Chinese sector that is
under investigation in a subsequent case.
In Laminate Flooring, 9 a 2005 dumping and subsidy investigation under
the CBSA's new policy, the Agency concluded that in that particular sector
China was a free market, and dumping margins were therefore assessed in
the normal case using estimated costs of production in China. The
complainant disagreed with that approach. It made representations to the
Agency to change it. These submissions were rejected:
Counsel for the complainant provided representations that the CBSA
policy on section 20, issued in June 2004, is 'wrong in law and in
policy and ought to be reversed.' Counsel quotes SIMA, and the
Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China to the
WTO and states that the onus should be on Chinese exporters to clearly
show that market economy conditions prevail in China rather than
Canadian producers showing an absence of market conditions in
China.
The CBSA addressed this subject in the SOR issued at the preliminary
determination of this investigation. The CBSA did not find any
information during its verification visits of the two largest Chinese
exporters nor was any additional information provided to the CBSA
that would suggest that the GPRC was substantially determining
domestic prices of laminate flooring.20
The result was a final dumping margin for China of the relatively modest
average amount of just short of 8% (as a percentage of the export price) with
0% margins for one of the exporting companies. 21 The Agency's method of
calculating final dumping margins for China is currently the subject of a
judicial review application to the Federal Court of Appeal brought by the
complainant.22 The Agency's decision that Chinese producers were operating
in an open market, however, is not one of the issues in the application.
19 Certain Laminate Flooring - Statement of Reasons for Final Determination, File No.
4214-4, AD/1332; 4218-19, CVD/104, 9H 56-57 (Can. Border Services Agency June 1, 2005)
http://www.asfc-cbsa.gc.calsima-lmsili-e/adl332/ad1332nf-eng.html [hereinafter Laminate
Flooring- Final];see also Certain Laminate Flooring - Statement of Reasons for Preliminary
Determination, File No. 4214-4, AD/1332; 4218-19, CVD/104, 1 123 (Can. Border Services
Agency Mar. 3, 2005), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima/anti-dumping/adl332pe.html.
20 Laminate Flooring - Final,supra at note 18.
21 Id., Appendix 2. In the same determination, the subsidy amount, discussed further
below, was found to be very small for most of the Chinese-based producers and exporters,
with the average subsidy equaling merely 3% as a percentage of the export price. Id.
22 See generally, Uniboard Surfaces Inc. v. Kronotex Fussboden GmbH and Co., No. A-
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The changes in Canadian policy regarding China have caused Canadian
trade remedy laws to diverge substantially from those in the United States.
Under U.S. policy, China is considered by the Commerce Department to be a
non-market economy 23 and this policy seems unlikely to change, at least in
the near term.24
Since the 2004 policy change in Canada, there have been five dumping
investigations involving Chinese-origin goods where the CBSA rejected use
of surrogate-country data for normal value purposes - that is, the CBSA
determined that, for those particular goods, Chinese producers operated
under market economy conditions. Estimates of normal values followed the
usual course of investigations where exports from market economy countries
were involved.2 5 In the most recent investigation in Copper Pipe Fittings,
285-05, [2006] CarswellNat 4337, (Federal Court of Appeals Dec. 7, 2006) (Westlaw).
23 Under U.S. law, an non-market economy country (NME) is a country that does not
operate on market principles "so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the
fair value of the merchandise." Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1677(18) (1996). China is one
of twelve countries that the Department of Commerce has determined to be an NME. Given
current political circumstances, it is uncertain when or whether that designation will change in
the near future. For a useful review of U.S. law and policy on this issue, see Challenges and
Choices to Apply CountervailingDuties to China: Hearing on U.S.-China Trade Before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 109 tb Cong. (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06608t.pdf (statement of Loren Yager, Director of
International Affairs and Trade, United States Government Accountability Office); and
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AccouNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S.-CHINA TRADE: ELIMINATING
NONMARKET ECONOMY METHODOLOGY WOULD LOWER ANTIDUMPING DUTIS FOR SOME
CHINESE COMPANIES, (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06231.pdf (report

to Congressional Committees).
24 In a press release commenting on the dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese
governments in the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade ("JCCT") on the possibility of
altering China's NME designation, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, no doubt reflecting
political pressures, stated that, "Until these reforms are made - and the statutory criteria are
met - China will continue to be considered a non-market economy under U.S. anti-dumping
law, and American companies alleging unfair trade practices are generally more likely to be
successful." Press Release, Donald L. Evans, Sec'y of Commerce, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
America's Economic Relationship with China (Apr. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary-Evans/2004-Releases/AprilV28-EvansChina
_stmt.htm.

25 See Certain Steel Fuel Tanks - Statement of Reasons for Final Determination,
File No.
4264-62, AD/1298,
47-53 (Can. Border Services Agency Aug. 18 2004), available at

http://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/adl298/adl 298i-eng.html; Outdoor Barbeques - Statement

of Reasons for Preliminary Determination, File No. 4235-264, AD/1318; 4218-16, CVD/102,
45 (Can. Border Services Agency Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.cbsaasfc.gc.ca/sima-Imsi/i-e/adl3 18/ad 1318i-eng.html
[hereinafter Outdoor Barbeques Preliminary];Certain Carbon Steel and Stainless Steel Fasteners - Statement of Reasons for
Final Determination, File No. 4243-38, 4218-17, AD/1308, CVD/103, 44-55 (Can. Border
Services Agency Dec. 24, 2004), available at http://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/ie/adl308/adl308i-eng.html [hereinafter Fasteners- Final]; Laminate Flooring - Final supra
note 18, at
144; Certain Copper Pipe Fittings - Statement of Reasons for Preliminary
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which is continuing at this time, the Agency estimated dumping margins of
26
39% for three identified exporters, with an all-others rate of 116 percent.
The Agency is proceeding on the basis that the copper pipe fittings sector in
China operates free of State involvement on a market economy basis.2 7
III. Subsidies - Canadian Countervail Cases Achieve Mixed Results
As a practical matter, the change in Canadian policy regarding China's
market economy status affected dumping investigations only. It had no
bearing on Canada's approach to subsidy investigations. The absence of
subsidy complaints regarding Chinese imports over the years was not
because of impediments under Canadian law.28 Rather, it was mainly the
reluctance of Canadian industry to initiate these kinds of cases, given the
many practical difficulties and large legal expenses in bringing such cases
forward. The preference was to go pragmatically for more expeditious, less
expensive and more likely - if not perfect - anti-dumping relief. This was
preferable to the slow, cumbersome, costly - and not entirely certain countervail relief.
Outdoor Barbeques29 in 2004 was the first Canadian trade case involving
subsidized imports from China. The complaint was filed on the basis that the
Investigation, File No. 4214-14, AD/1358, 4218-21, CVD/118, [ 93-98 (Can. Border
Services Agency Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/ie/ad1358/adl358np-eng.html [hereinafter Copper Pipe Fittings- Preliminary].
26 Certain Copper Pipe Fittings- Preliminary,supra note 24,11162 app. 2.
27 See id. at
123-130, 162 app.4.
28 There is nothing in SIMA or the stated policies of the CBSA that prevents or limits
subsidized imports from NME countries being subjected to countervailing duties in Canada provided the criteria under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement are
met. See Dep't of Finance, Gov't of Canada, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Information
Paper
(Nov.
17,
2004),
available
at
http://www.fin.gc.ca/activty/pubs/Sube.html; see also Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations 275 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. [Not reproduced in I.L.M.], available at
http://docsonline.wto.org (follow "Frequently Consulted"; then follow "Legal Texts and
Agreements"; then follow "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures").
29 Outdoor Barbeques - Statement of Reasons for Initiation of Investigation, File No:
4235-264/ AD-1318; 4218-16/CVD-102,
65-68, 77 (Can. Border Services Agency Apr. 28,
2004), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/ [hereinafter Outdoor Barbeques Initiation]; Outdoor Barbeques - Preliminary, supra note 24; and Outdoor Barbeques Statement of Reasons for Termination of Investigation, File No: 4235-264, AD 1318, 4218-16,
CVD 102,
123-124, (Can. Border Services Agency Dec. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.asfc-cbsa.gc.ca/sima-lmsili-e/adl 318/ad 1318tsor-eng.html [hereinafter Outdoor
Barbeques - Termination]. OutdoorBarbeques - Initiation,Outdoor Barbeques- Preliminary,
and Outdoor Barbeques - Termination are hereinafter collectively referred to as Outdoor
Barbeques.
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Chinese barbeque industry operated in a free market without State controls,
thereby avoiding the policy issue of whether non-market economy countries
could be countervailed. In starting its investigation, the Agency accepted the
complainant's evidence of a large array of Chinese subsidy programs at the
national and sub-national level 3° and its ensuing preliminary subsidy
determination, and on the basis of incomplete information from Chinese
authorities, found that a large number of such programs conferred substantial
benefits on Chinese producers3 '.
After obtaining full responses to information requests and verifying that
information, however, the Agency radically adjusted its preliminary
estimates and concluded that the amount of subsidy benefits flowing to
Chinese barbeque makers was, in fact, inconsequential.32 Based on its
investigation of eight identified subsidy programs, the Agency found either
no benefit was in fact received or that the benefits were so insignificant that
they failed to meet WTO thresholds:
When making a final determination of subsidizing under subsection
41(1) of SIMA, the President must be satisfied that the subject goods
have been subsidized and that the amount of subsidy on the goods of a
country is not insignificant. According to subsection 2(1) of SIMA,
"insignificant" means an amount of subsidy that is less than 1% of the
export price of the goods.
However, section 41.2 of SIMA directs the President to take into
account the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11 of Article 27 of the
WTO Subsidies Agreement when conducting subsidy investigations.
These provisions stipulate, in part, that any investigation involving a
developing country must be terminated once it is determined that the
total amount of subsidy for a developing country does not exceed 2%
of the value of the goods.
The CBSA normally makes reference to Part I of the DAC List of Aid
Recipients, maintained by the OECD, to determine eligibility for the
differential amounts for developing countries in subsidy
30

See Outdoor Barbeques - Initiation, supra note 28

65-68, 77. Together with

subsidies, the complaint also alleged dumping of Chinese barbeques as a cause of material
injury. Id.
3I See Outdoor Barbeques - Preliminary,supra note 24, IN 73-74, 59-72, 99 app. 3.
32 See Outdoor Barbeques - Termination, supra note 28
123-124. While information
responses were deemed incomplete at the PD stage, subsequent filings were permitted by the
Agency. See id.,
2-7. It received what it certified as complete responses from both the
Chinese Government and four of the Chinese barbeque producers. See id., 71. Following
receipt of this information, the Agency undertook verifications that resulted in its de minimus
74-101,
determinations of both subsidy amounts as well as of dumping margins. See id.,
55-60.
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investigations. As China is a developing country according to this list,
the 2% threshold for insignificance would apply. In this case, the
amount of subsidy is below the 2% threshold, and as such requires the
termination of the investigation.33
Almost immediately after the Outdoor Barbeques case began, the
Fasteners investigation was initiated by the Agency. 34 This time, contrary to
the results in Outdoor Barbeques, the Fasteners investigation resulted in a
determination of fairly sizeable subsidy amounts and, ultimately, a positive
injury finding by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal.35 Here is what
the CBSA said at the start of the investigation:
In support of its allegations, the complainant has provided a number of
documents detailing support offered by the government of China
(GoC), primarily to exporting enterprises and those operating in
special economic areas. The complainant was unable to provide
specific information with regard to all potential subsidies granted by
the GoC, as there is a lack of publicly available information.
This lack of available information is largely due to the fact that China
has not provided a full notification to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as
required under Article 25 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement) and under Article
XVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. The Chair's
Report to Council for Trade in Goods in the Transitional Review of
China, November 2003, notes that updated versions of this information
have not been provided. Similarly, public reports from both the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) and the U.S. Department of Commerce
indicate that information regarding potential subsidies in China has not
been provided and is difficult to obtain.

13

Id., 1 104-106.

34 See Certain Carbon Steel and Stainless Steel Fasteners - Notice of Initiation of

Investigation, (Can. Border Services Agency Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www.asfccbsa.gc.ca/sima-imsi/i-e/adl308/adl308ni-eng.html; Certain Carbon Steel and Stainless Steel
Fasteners - Statement of Reasons for Initiation of Investigation, File No. 4243-38, AD/1308;
4218-17, CVD/103, (Can. Border Services Agency May 13, 2004), available at
http:l/www.asfc-cbsa.gc.ca/sima-Imsili-e/ad l 308/adl 308i-eng.html [hereinafter Fasteners Initiation].
35 See Fasteners - Findings and Reasons, Inquiry No. NQ-2004-005,
230, (Can. Int'l
Trade
Tribunal
Jan.
21,
2005),
available
at
http://www.citttcce.gc.ca/dumping/inquirie/findings/nq2eOO5e.asp [hereinafter Fasteners - Findings &
Reasons]; see also id., 116.
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In reviewing the information found in the reports and articles that were
provided by the complainant, the CBSA has developed the following
list of programs and incentives that may be provided to manufacturers
of fasteners in China ...
There is sufficient reason to believe that the programs and incentives
listed above may constitute actionable subsidies provided by the GoC.
Based on the information available to the CBSA regarding the
programs named above, it is reasonable to conclude that the named
subsidy programs are available to the exporters offasteners in China.
In examining these programs, the CBSA will request information from
the government of China and from exporters of the subject goods to
determine whether these programs confer countervailable benefits on
the subject goods.36
In the ensuing preliminary determination phase of the investigation, the

Agency failed to get complete responses to information requests ("RFIs")
from either the Government of China or the Chinese fasteners industry. It
therefore used estimates based on best available information 37 and found that
State benefits were provided under the following eight programs: (1) Special
Economic Area ("SEA") incentives; (2) grants for export performance and

employing common workers; (3) preferential loans; (4) loan guarantees; (5)
income tax credits, refunds, and exemptions including (a) reduced corporate
36

Fasteners- Initiation,supra note 33,

52-57 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

37 The agency reasoned as follows:

[109] The Government of China's response to all questions asked within the original
RFI and the various supplemental RFIs was expected to be a comprehensive response
encompassing all parties covered by the above definition of 'Government of China',
and not to be restricted solely to the national level of government. The failure to
provide this information renders incomplete any response that the Government of
China has made with regards to actionable subsidies that it may or may not have made
available to exporters of subject goods during the POI.
[110] The CBSA has requested that the Government of China provide a revised
response to its original and supplemental RFIs reflecting information obtained through
its own records rather than from enquiries of exporters, in order to corroborate
exporters' submissions and to provide additional information regarding the potential
subsidies available in the People's Republic of China. The CBSA also stressed the
definition of the "Government of China" applicable for this investigation, and
requested that responses to its questions be a comprehensive response from the entire
Government of China.
[111] The information submitted by the Government of China in response to the
original and supplemental questionnaires has been deemed to be incomplete and
unusable for purposes of making a preliminary determination.
Certain Carbon Steel and Stainless Steel Fasteners - Statement of Reasons for Preliminary
Determination, File No. 4243-38, AS/1308; 4218-17, CVD/103 (Can. Border Services Agency
Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://www.asfc-cbsa.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/adl308/adl3O8peng.html.

Herman-The China Factor: Canada'sTrade Remedy Response

tax rate for export-oriented enterprises, (b) exemption/reduction of corporate
income tax during designated start-up periods, (c) income tax refund of
amounts further invested in SEAs, and (d) exemption/reduction in local
income tax for SEA enterprises; (6) relief from duties and taxes on inputs; (7)
reductions in land use fees; and (8) purchase of goods from State-owned
enterprises. 38
For the final determination, the Chinese government's responses to RFIs,
as well as those of the majority of producers that were investigated, were still
not complete. Among other deficiencies,
[T]he Sixth Supplemental RFI requested information from the GOC
relating to levels of government below the national level, in order to
determine whether any provincial, municipal, county, or other levels
of government had made a financial contribution that might be
considered an actionable subsidy to one or more of the sampled
exporters. While a limited amount of information was submitted,
other documents requested from the GOC regarding local governments
were not provided.39
The Agency therefore continued to determine subsidies and subsidy
amounts based on available information. For the final determination, it
concluded that Chinese carbon steel and stainless steel fastener producers
received benefits amounting to approximately 32% of the export price. n In
the ensuing inquiry, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal found that
injury was caused by the dumping and subsidizing of carbon steel screws
from China (but not by dumping or subsidizing of nuts and bolts). 41 The
essence of the Tribunal's finding on screws was that dumped and subsidized
imports had a price-depressing impact on the Canadian industry, leading to a
range of deteriorating financial indicators:
The Tribunal is of the view that the increasing presence of imports of
carbon steel screws from the subject countries had widespread
38 Id., [69.
39 Fasteners- Final,supra note 24,

81.

40 Id., 94. It should be noted that the investigation also concerned allegedly subsidized
exports from Chinese Taipei as well as China. The Agency found that the subsidy amounts for
goods from Chinese Taipei were insignificant and terminated the countervail investigation
respecting the latter. See also id., 1$ 97-99.
41 Fasteners- Findings & Reasons, supra note 34, 1 127, 230. In conducting its inquiry,
the Tribunal decided to subdivide the goods into carbon steel screws, stainless steel screws,
carbon steel nuts and bolts and stainless steel nuts and bolts. Id., 75. It found that dumped
carbon steel screws from China and Chinese Taipei and subsidized carbon steel screws from
China had caused injury to Canadian production. See id., [M107-127.
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negative impacts on the domestic industry. In fact, the Tribunal notes
that the parties opposing the complaint were not denying so much that
the domestic industry had suffered injury as they were arguing that the
cause of that injury rested with factors other than the presence of the
subject carbon steel screws in the market. While noting these other
factors, some of which are dealt with below, the Tribunal is
nevertheless of the view that the dumped and subsidized carbon steel
screws were a very significant cause of injury to the domestic
industry.
This was the first Canadian countervail case against China to proceed
through to a positive injury finding. However, this positive result (from the
complaining industry's viewpoint) has to be tempered by the modest average
subsidy amounts of 32%. While in some respects this is a significant amount,
as a practical matter, this level of CV duties, even when combined with AD
duties, provided the Canadian fastener producers with only modest import
relief. Another factor in assessing the impact of the subsidy findings in
Fasteners is that the 32% subsidy amount was estimated by the Agency
using best available information. Even applying this discretionary method,
the total subsidy amount was not astonishingly high.
Fasteners has been followed by the Laminate Flooring - Final case, as
noted, in which the CBSA also found a large number of actionable Chinese
subsidy programs, some of which were the same or similar to the subsidy
programs identified in Fasteners.43 However, the total amounts of subsidies
calculated by the Agency in this case were substantially less than in
Fasteners,averaging a mere 3% of the export price."a
In the ongoing Copper Pipe Fittings case, the preliminary subsidy
estimates for China are 64% as a percentage of the export price. 45 While this
amount is significant, it is based on unverified information and is much less
than the complaining industry would have expected at this preliminary stage.
From the point of view of the Canadian complainants, the meager results
in Outdoor Barbeques, Fasteners, and Laminate Flooring begs the question
as to the value of pursuing countervail relief against Chinese products,
42

Id.,

122.

43 See Laminate Flooring - Final, supra note 18,

91; see also id., 145 app. 3. The
programs found by the Agency to have conferred countervailable benefits included a range of
preferential income tax programs for Foreign Invested Enterprises ("FIEs"), for enterprises
locations in Special Economic Zones ("SEZs") and Coastal Economic Open Zones and for
enterprises operating in the forestry industry; exemptions on tariffs and VAT for imported
equipment; loan interest assistance grants and other grants to companies operating in specific
areas, etc. Id.
44 Id., 198.
45 CopperPipe Fittings- Preliminary,supra note 24, 128.
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particularly in the consumer products area. Even accepting that the result in
Fasteners was somewhat more beneficial to the industry than in Laminate
Flooring, the results leave real doubts as to the extent to which Chinese
export industries are, or can be shown to be, the recipients of large subsidy
benefits.
IV. Safeguard Relief Involving Goods from China
Canadian legislation was amended in 2002 to implement the Protocol on
46
China's accession to the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement"),
which permits members to apply safeguard relief to aid industries in coping
with an influx of Chinese products. Pursuant to new Section 30.22(1) of the
Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act ("CITT Act"), 47 a Canadian
industry can submit a safeguard complaint to the Tribunal - as opposed to the
CBSA as in the case of subsidies and dumping - requesting the Tribunal to
initiate an inquiry into whether the importation of goods from China has been
causing or is threatening to cause market disruption to domestic producers.4 8
If the Tribunal concludes that market disruption exists or is likely to occur in
the future and is likely to be a "significant cause" of material injury, it can
the forms of relief to be accorded the
recommend to the Federal government
49
injury.
that
remedy
to
industry

Bill C-50 was
46 See Act Amending China's Accession to the WTO, supra note 15.
introduced in the Canadian Parliament in 2002 to amend existing federal legislation in order to
implement the rights contained in the WTO's agreement with China. China's accession to the
WTO was preceded by a series of bilateral agreements with China's trading partners, leading
to full agreement by a Working Party and subsequently by the WTO General Council to admit
China as a WTO member, as set out in the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic
of China to the World Trade Organization. See World Trade Organization, Accession of the
People's Republic of China Decision of 10 Nov. 2001, WT/LJ432/NOV/23, (2001), available
or
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/IWT/L/432.doc
at
The provisions in the
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acce/completeacce.htm.
Protocol set out the rights that Canada - and all other WTO members - obtained through the
accession negotiations with China.
47 ClT Act, supra note 3, § 30.22(1) (as amended by S.C. 2002, ch. 19, § 4).
48 See Interim Guideline: Safeguard Inquiries- Imports From China, (Can. Int'l Trade
Tribunal Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.citt-tcce.gc.ca/publicat/china-e.asp
(explaining the market disruption inquiries). A full explanation of the Canadian safeguard
regime where imports from China are concerned is found on the CITI website:
http://www.citt.gc.ca/safeguar/guide/index-e.asp.
9 In accordance with the WTO Protocol, Canadian law also allows Canadian producers to
request a trade diversion inquiry to determine whether any action of another WTO member
respecting Chinese goods is causing or threatening to cause "significant diversion of trade"
into Canada. To date, no such inquiries have been initiated. See CITT Act, supra note 3, §§
30.21 - 30.26 (explaining the Tribunal's procedures and standards of inquiry into market
disruption and trade diversion).
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The U.S. has a similar China safeguard system. Much of the Canadian
process parallels that of the United States.50 As in the U.S., Chinese market
disruption safeguard relief is distinct from global safeguard relief, where the
injurious effects of imports are assessed globally - i.e., from all sources. The
relief for goods from China, as is clear, is exceptional and is targeted on
goods of that country exclusively.
To start a case, a Canadian producer must first submit a properly
documented complaint (in itself a complex and expensive process) to the
Tribunal, not the CBSA as in the case of AD/CV complaints. Once the
Tribunal determines to conduct an inquiry, it is necessary for a companion
order of the Canadian Cabinet (an Order in Council) to direct the Tribunal to
recommend, in the event that its determines that the goods are being
imported in such increased quantities or under such conditions that they
cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers, the
most appropriate remedy. Relief can only last for a period not exceeding
three years, in accordance with Chinese accession agreements under the
WTO Agreement.
The form of relief that the Tribunal can recommend varies - it can be
surtaxes, quotas, or tariff rate quotas, or any combination of these. As in the
United States, there is no legal obligation for the Federal government to act
on those recommendations. The government can decide to modify any such
recommendation or refuse to act entirely and provide any relief whatsoever.5'
Like the U.S. system, the Canadian safeguard system is Byzantine,
cumbersome, and complex. It is frustrating for domestic industries and
responding parties alike. The conclusion after the recent experience is that
the process entails significant hurdles and large legal expenses, likely to be a
disincentive to future complainants.
52
The result of the single market disruption inquiry to date in Barbeques
illustrates the point. Barbeques was started by a complaint filed by the
5o China safeguard investigations come under Section 421 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974,
19 U.S.C. 2251 (2007). As with the Canadian system, the United States International Trade
Commission ("ITC") determines whether a product from China is being imported into the
United States in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to cause or threaten to
cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like or directly competitive products. If
the ITC makes an affirmative determination, it proposes a remedy. The ITC sends its report to
the President and the U.S. Trade Representative. The President makes the final remedy
decision.
51 See generally CITT Act, supra note 3, § 30.22(8) (1985) ("The Tribunal shall prepare a
report on the inquiry not later than ninety days after the inquiry is commenced and shall
submit a copy of it to the Governor in Council, the Minister, the complainant and any other
person who made representations to the Tribunal during the inquiry."). There is no further
obligation on the part of the Federal government to act.
52 Barbeques Originating in the People's Republic of China - Findings and Reasons,
Inquiry No. CS-2005-001, (Can. Int'l Trade Tribunal Oct. 11, 2005), available at
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Canadian barbeque producers 53 following the surprise termination of the
AD/CV investigation, noted above. After some delay, the complaint was
eventually certified as properly documented and a market disruption
safeguard inquiry was initiated by the Tribunal. After detailed written
submissions and a lengthy oral hearing phase, the Tribunal found that
imported barbeques from China were a significant cause of serious injury to
Canadian production 54 and it recommended a system of relief based on tariff
rate quotas. 55 The Tribunal engaged in a three-step process, as required by
statute. First, it determined that the domestic industry had suffered serious
injury during the period under review. Second, it found that imports of
barbeques from China were a significant cause of that injury:
Having assessed, pursuant to subsection 5.1 of the Regulations, the
actual volume of imports, the effect of such imports on prices and their
impact on domestic producers, and having considered other potential
causes of injury, the Tribunal finds that imports of barbeques from
China are indeed a significant cause of the material injury experienced
by domestic producers because they are an important cause of that
injury (i.e. a cause "...that need56not be as important as, or more
important than, any other cause.").
Having made these two findings, the Tribunal then considered the nature
and form of relief to recommend to the Federal government. It recommended
a surtax set at 15% for a period of three years, applied on an ad valorem
basis, FOB Chinese port of shipment as a means of raising the market price
57
to a level that insured the Canadian industry could satisfactorily compete.
http://www.citt-tcce.gc.ca/safeguar/marinq/finalrep/cs2f0Ole.asp [hereinafter Barbeques Findings& Reasons].
53 Commissions: Canadian International Trade Tribunal Decision to Commence a
Safeguard Inquiry in Respect of China Certain Outdoor Barbeques, CAN. GAZETrE, July 23,
2005, available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partI/2005/20050723html/commis-e.html.
54 Barbeques - Findings & Reasons, supra note 51, 139.
51 Id., 151-164.
56 Id., 136.
57 See id., 1 164. The Tribunal reasoned as follows:
[T]he methodology used by the Tribunal in making the calculation involves deriving
the first-cost advantage for Chinese producers by multiplying the domestic producers'
reported average unit cost of manufacturing by the 40 percent differential noted above.
The number so derived is then reduced by the average unit cost of importation. The
difference between the two numbers is the estimated Chinese net-cost advantage after
accounting for the cost of importation into Canada. The calculation shows that when
imports of barbeques from China had fully penetrated the Canadian market at all retail
segments by 2004, they were below domestic costs by about 15 to 20 percent,
expressed as a percentage of Chinese FOB values at port of shipment.
The Tribunal notes that the actual Chinese net-cost advantage in Canada, at any given time, is
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After many months of sitting on these recommendations, 58 the Federal
government announced that it would not provide any relief, recommended or
otherwise. As announced by the Canadian Minister of Finance,
After considering all of the information, it was determined that
temporary protective tariffs simply wouldn't provide a competitive
long-term solution in these two cases [barbeques and bicycles].... We
want to grow and strengthen our economy, and imposing these
surtaxes would have increased costs for both Canadian retailers and
consumers.
The Government of Canada recognizes that many Canadian
manufacturers are adjusting to fast-changing global realities.... We
will continue to work closely with the private sector to develop trade
strategies that 59will maximize the benefits of Canada's role in global
supply chains.
The foregoing is the case where the Canadian complainants proceeded
through the maze of procedural and other requirements, engaged in the
necessary meetings and other activities to convince political decision-makers
as to the merits of the Tribunal's recommendation, expended large sums on
legal and consulting fees and, in the end, came up empty-handed. In another
situation, Canadian complainants sought to convince the Tribunal to initiate a
subject to the fluctuation of factors such as the cost of ocean and inland freight and exchange
rate movements. As freight rates rise, as they have in recent periods, the Chinese net-cost
advantage is reduced. As the Canadian dollar appreciates, as it has in recent periods, the
Chinese net-cost advantage increases. According to the evidence, rising freight rates have been
an important factor in recent quarters. Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the
Tribunal is of the view that a surtax of 15 percent is the appropriate remedy, applied on an ad
valorem basis, FOB Chinese port of shipment. Id., 1[160-161.
58 Including recommendations by the Tribunal in a companion global safeguard
inquiry
concerning bicycles and bicycle frames, which the Canadian International Trade Tribunal
initiated on February 10, 2005 following a complaint from some Canadian producers. On
September 1, 2005, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal submitted its report to the
Government, concluding that imports of bicycle frames were not injuring the domestic
industry, but that imports of bicycles were causing injury to the domestic industry. The
Canadian International Trade Tribunal recommended the imposition of a declining surtax
(thirty percent in the first year, twenty-five percent in the second year and twenty percent in
the third year) to be applied on bicycles valued at $225 or less at the time of importation.
Bicycles and Finished Painted Bicycle Frames - Final Report on Safeguard Inquiry, Inquiry
No. GS-2004-001/GS-2004-002, at VI, (Can. Int'l Trade Tribunal, Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.citt-tcce.gc.ca/safeguar/global/finalrep/gs2eOO _e.asp.
9 Press Release, Dep't of Fin. Can., Government of Canada Rejects Trade Restriction on
Imported
Bicycles
and
Barbeques
(May
29,
2006),
available
at
http://www.fin.gc.ca/newsO6/06-019e.html. As noted in the press release, the government
likewise declined to act on recommendations made by the Tribunal in the global safeguard
action in Bicycles and Finished Painted Bicycle Frames cited in note 51, supra.
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market disruption inquiry and, after many months
of effort, failed to
6
convince the Tribunal to even begin its investigation. 0
These cases are illustrative of substantive and procedural difficulties in
Canadian trade law in obtaining safeguard relief against imported products
from China. The practical results of these recent efforts have effectively been
zero for the complainants. The impact has been to dampen enthusiasm
among the manufacturing sector for dealing with trade competition from
China in this traditional, WTO-sanctioned way.
V. Other Issues - Investment Restrictions Affecting Chinese Capital
While somewhat outside the scope of a trade remedy analysis, there has
been concern expressed by the Federal government (both the former Liberal
government and the present Conservative government) over large-scale
Chinese State-owned enterprise investments in and takeovers of Canadian
companies. The concern has been expressed in terms of protecting Canadian
national security where Chinese State-owned enterprises are concerned, on
the basis that such Chinese enterprises operate under the direction, directly or
indirectly, of the Chinese government. 61 Apart from the political dimension
relating to human rights in China, the concern is over the direction such
ownership might take and the impact on the Canadian economy.
Suggestions are being seriously pursued to amend the Investment Canada
Act 62 to permit the Canadian government to disallow a takeover of a
Canadian company on certain, well-defined national security grounds.

60 See Residential Furniture Originating in China - Market Disruption Inquiry, Inquiry No.
CS-2005-003
(Can. Int'l
Trade Tribunal
Mar.
15,
2006), available at
http://www.citt.gc.ca/safeguar/marinq/complaint/cs2f003_e.asp
(complaint not properly
documented). Here, the Tribunal refused to commence its investigation on the grounds, inter
alia, that the complainant failed to properly subdivide the goods. On March 15, 2006, the
Tribunal issued a letter explaining why it was turning down the complaint:
[T]he Tribunal is of the opinion that these categories appear to be too broad to meet
the requirements of like or directly competitive goods. The Tribunal must look at all of
the eight potential classes of like or directly competitive goods (or whatever other
classes of goods the complainant may propose) in determining whether your complaint
fulfills the requirements of subsection 30.22(2) of the Canadian Int'l Trade Tribunal
Act. In a future complaint, you may wish to select only a certain number of groups or
classes on which to base the complaint and for which the required information would
need to be submitted. Id.
61 Steven Chase & Brian Laghi, Ottawa Red Flags Foreign Buyouts;
Fearing China's
Growing Power, Tories to Stop Deals that Hurt National Interests, THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
Nov. 25, 2006, at Al; Shawn McCarthy, Flaherty Defends Plan to Screen Foreign Takeovers;
'It is important that we protect Canada;' Critics Say Chance will Drive Off Chinese, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 28, 2006, at B4.
62 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. ch. 28, §1 (1985).
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VI. Conclusions
It is difficult to conclude whether and to what extent Canada's system of
trade remedies constitutes a useful response to the influx of Chinese products
into the Canadian marketplace. While anti-dumping relief has been
historically used by Canadian industry to deal with allegedly unfairly priced
imports from that country, some recent cases have revealed either the
absence of dumping or relatively low margins. These results have been of
questionable value to the domestic industry.
Pressure has been applied by several sectors of Canadian industry to try to
rollback the change in policy of the CBSA respecting whether the Chinese
economy operates under free-market principles. Formerly, the onus was on
the Chinese side to demonstrate that an open market was in operation. The
recent change by the CBSA puts the onus on the Canadian complainant to
prove that free market principles do not operate. There is little likelihood that
the new CBSA policy will be rolled back.
With respect to subsidies, the Canadian record has been mixed. While
Canada has investigated alleged Chinese subsidies in a number of recent
cases and has found subsidies to be countervailable, either these conclusions
have been based on best available information or, where verified, the subsidy
amounts have proven to be modest. In the event that more complete
information comes forward from the Chinese government and the targeted
industry, the very existence of these alleged subsidies might be called into
question.
In the recent Outdoor Barbeques case, for example, the CBSA found on
verification visits that no subsidies to that particular industry existed. In
Fasteners and the ongoing Copper Pipe Fittings case, the estimated subsidy
amounts, while noteworthy, are still relatively modest, even when best
information has been used. The conclusion, therefore, is that the existence of
large subsidies in China cannot be assumed but will require examination on
an industry-by-industry basis.
Safeguard relief for Canadian companies experiencing competition from
Chinese imports has not been successful in the single market disruption
inquiry to date as a result of a policy decision taken by the government to not
grant relief. In other cases, the complainants could not even surmount the
hurdle of getting a safeguard investigation underway. Given the complexities
and large expense of pursuing safeguard relief, it is doubtful whether
Canadian industry will have much of an appetite to initiate new complaints.
Finally, with respect to investment in large Canadian enterprises by
Chinese State-owned companies, there is serious concern at the level of the
Federal government in Canada. Efforts are underway to find ways to amend
Canadian laws, consistent with Canada's international obligations, to
disallow such investments where there is a risk to Canada's national security

Herman-The China Factor: Canada'sTrade Remedy Response

47

interests. This particular area is likely to be a source of tension between
Ottawa and Beijing in the years ahead.

